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ABSTRACT
The feminized imaginary of “home and hearth” has long been central to the notion
of soldiering as masculinist protection. Soldiering and war are not only materialized
by gendered imaginaries of home and hearth though, but through everyday labors
enacted within the home. Focusing on in-depth qualitative research with women
partners and spouses of British Army reservists, we examine how women’s
everyday domestic and emotional labor enables reservists to serve, constituting
“hearth and home” as a site through which war is made possible. As reservists –
who are still overwhelmingly heterosexual men – become increasingly called
upon by the state, one must consider how the changing nature of the Army’s
procurement of soldiers is also changing demands on women’s labor. Feminist
IPE scholars have shown broader trends in the outsourcing of labor to women
and its privatization. Our research similarly underscores the significance of
everyday gendered labor to the geopolitical. Moreover, we highlight the fragility
of military power, given that women can withdraw their labor at any time. The
article concludes that paying attention to women’s everyday labor in the home
facilitates greater understanding of one of the key sites through which war is
both materialized and challenged.
KEYWORDS Gendered labor; home and hearth; reservist’s wives/women partners; war; military power
Introduction
This article examines how everyday gendered forms of labor in the home,
specifically the labor of the women partners and wives of reservists (hereafter
“women partners”), reproduce and challenge the state’s capacity to wage war.
Feminists have long-argued that the home is a symbolic site that has been
reified as that which is fought for and that markets, states and armed forces
have relied on women’s unpaid labor within the home for centuries, even
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though its value to national and global economies is habitually obscured (inter
alia Elshtain 1981; Pateman 1988; Yuval-Davis 1997; Basham 2008; Rai,
Hoskyns, and Thomas 2014; Gray 2016). The invisibility of women’s household
labor is the outcome of gendered practices whereby the home has been
designated as private and apolitical; as distinct from the public sphere domi-
nated by men constituted as its “key players” and, thus, the shapers of (geo)-
political agendas. The resultant division of “public” from “private” has made
women’s experiences less visible, disguised the toll “domestic” labor takes,
and enabled men to dominate both spheres. The traditional casting of the
state as both agent and referent of military security has further worked to
confine gender relations to the “domestic” and “private” sphere. The everyday
is, thus, both an empirical reality and an outcome of discursive processes
“through which some aspects of social phenomena are defined as global
and others as mundane” (Chisholm and Stachowitsch 2016, 826).
Though the household and its significance have been explored in feminist
analyses of global political economy and geopolitics (inter alia Enloe 1989;
Harrison and Laliberté 1997; Dowler 2012; Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas 2014;
Elias and Roberts 2016), much of this literature does not directly deal with
the “military home” nor the specific ways in which women’s labor in it repro-
duces military power. Addressing this is important, because whilst the
growing expectations of reserve families reflect broader trends wherein
women’s domestic labor is discounted from evaluations of economies
despite being central to their functioning (Hoskyns and Rai 2007; Peterson
2010, 2013; Elias 2011; Elias and Rai 2015), it is also vital to consider the specific
ways in which the changing nature of how the Army recruits is also changing
the nature and extent of labor required by families, especially women part-
ners. Moreover, despite the “relative paucity of research on women married
to servicemen,” particularly within the UK context (Hyde 2016, 857), research
on women married to reservists, as opposed to regular soldiers, is scarcer still.
As we will show, whilst military power heavily relies on the unpaid labor of all
women partners of soldiers, reservists’ partners are mobilized differently. By
drawing on insights from in-depth qualitative research with British Army
reservists’ women partners and reservists, we aim to contribute to these
debates by showing how specific forms of women’s labor, in the context of
reserve service, reproduce war. Moreover, though the influence of geopolitics
on the home has been considered, it is important to ask “how geopolitics is
influenced by, and emerges from, the home” (Brickell 2012, 575, original
emphasis). Failing to do so could cast women as passive reproducers of the
geopolitical when they have considerable agency vis-à-vis “domestic” roles
to destabilize and reconfigure it. As Enloe (1989, 3) argues, paying “serious
attention to women” and their labor continues to be important, because it
“can expose [just] how much power it takes to maintain the international pol-
itical system in its present form.” Following Enloe, we aim to show how war is
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animated by practices of social reproduction in the homes of reservists and
their women partners (Tickner 1992; Basham 2013). We argue that the labor
of these women not only enables reservists to engage in military activities,
but also the British state to wage war and prepare for it by maintaining its
armed forces. “Home and hearth” is, therefore, a significant site from where
war materializes.
The research discussed herein comprises over sixty interviews with British
Army reservists, nine interviews with spouses/partners (eight of whom are
women) and interviews with unit staff and commanders, senior military per-
sonnel and members of military family support organizations.1 All intervie-
wees participated voluntarily by contacting us. After reading our study’s
participant information sheet and providing written informed consent we
interviewed participants face-to-face or by telephone. Reservists were primar-
ily recruited through on-site presentations during which we distributed
recruitment leaflets. Following interviews with them, we asked that they pass
on a further recruitment leaflet to their spouse/partner inviting them for an
interview. Our relatively small sample of spouses/partners reflects our reliance
on reservists passing information on and their geographical dispersal, which
made on-site recruitment presentations impractical. Nonetheless, by employing
a feminist “grounded theory” approach that seeks to center women’s voices
and experiences and theorize their wider significance, we offer theoretical prop-
ositions grounded in empirical data. As in any grounded study, our sample size’s
adequacy is determined by its richness and our striving to involve as many
experiences as possible to develop our analysis (Baxter and Eyles 1997).
The article proceeds in two sections. The first explores how (predomi-
nantly) male reservists rely on their women partners “picking up the slack”
to be able to undertake military service. We aim to show that the household
is a site that facilitates soldiering, and ultimately, preparations for war and its
execution.2 To do so, we consider some of the different forms women’s labor
takes and its impact on those women. From this, we problematize the notion
that it is the reservist’s “spare-time” that the Army foremost requires by
making women’s labor and its significance to military power more visible.
The second section considers how the Army’s reliance on women’s labor
not only facilitates war and war preparedness, but has the capacity to desta-
bilize it. As Hyde (2016) highlights in relation to the wives of regular soldiers,
their domestic and emotional labor connects with the soldiering labor of their
husbands. Exploring the negotiations this entails can reveal the emotional
contingency produced when military readiness is expected of both. This
emotional contingency can, we argue, lead reservists’ women partners to
question their support for reservists which could lead them to exit the military
to avoid risking their relationships. Moreover, we suggest that military power’s
reliance on reservists’ women partners may be precarious, because reservists’
women partners are located outside of the formalized structures of support
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provided to “regular” military families, however imperfect they are (Gray
2016; Hyde 2016) or however much they normalize the military’s expec-
tations of wives (Harrison and Laliberté 1997). Accordingly, we conclude
that by centering the lived experiences of women in relationships with reser-
vists and by focusing attention to their everyday labors in the home, we can
expose the contingent nature of the state’s ability to wage war and make
preparations for its eventuality. Women’s lived experiences offer us both a
glimpse into just how much gendered power is required for war to
become possible, and the capacity for women, through their everyday prac-
tices, to destabilize it.
Picking up the slack
As a result of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (HM Govern-
ment 2010), the ongoing transformation of the British military has entailed,
among other things, cuts to the regular Army and targets to recruit greater
numbers of volunteer “part-time” soldiers to the Army Reserve.3 The UK mili-
tary does not currently collect systematic data on the sexual orientation of its
military personnel,4 but research from before same-sex couples were legally
entitled to marry in the UK shows that both regulars and reservists were
more likely to be married and less likely to be divorced, as compared with
the general population of England and Wales (Keeling, Wessely, and Fear
2017). Whilst women are serving in greater numbers in the Reserves –
especially when compared to the regular Army – the Reserves is dominated
by men.5 Though not all of these men will be in relationships, and not all of
them will be heterosexual relationships,6 self-reporting and research
suggest that most servicemen in the Army Reserves in relationships will be
in heterosexual ones with women (Keeling, Wessely, and Fear 2017). As
such, the women partners of male reservists form the focus of this article.
Gender-focused scholarship has traditionally been more attentive to men
and masculinities in war, unsurprisingly given that, the world over, men dom-
inate state militaries and security apparatuses. Women, in contrast, continue
to be overrepresented in “auxiliary roles” (prostitutes, wives, nurses, etc.).
Thus, whilst women are sometimes found in the state military apparatus or
at its periphery, men are the state military apparatus (Enloe 2000; Sasson-
Levy 2003). As Hyde (2014) notes, the women partners of military men have
long been an “invisible, reserve-reserve army of labour” for militaries. The
Army’s increased reliance on reservists, thus, requires a consideration of
how their women partners may constitute a further reserve army of labor.
Militaries have typically been described as “greedy institutions,” because
they limit the time and energy their personnel can devote elsewhere, includ-
ing family (Segal 1986; Hockey 1986). For the women partners of regular sol-
diers, re-postings and expectations that families will live “on base” has often
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entailed women sacrificing their own careers and regularly uprooting their
lives (Gray 2016; Hyde 2016). As Enloe (1989) argues, the “ideal military
wife” is a woman content to adopt the military’s worldview and see them-
selves as “serving” too. Plans to expand the Reserves mean the Army is
likely to become much “greedier” towards reservists, but the implications
for their women partners differ. Whereas the requirement to re-site the
home on the military base means the Army very deliberately inserts itself
into the “private” lives of its regular personnel and their families, its reliance
on reservists’ women partners is far less visible but no less significant. Most
reservists work full-time and, therefore,7 the Army (n.d.) expects them to
serve during what it calls their “spare-time.” This implies reserve service is a
quasi-leisure activity. Mobilizing reservists relies heavily on the malleability
of the work/spare-time distinction, because time outside paid employment
such as evenings, weekends and periods of annual leave is rarely actually
going “spare”; it is often time that could be spent, among other things, fulfill-
ing household responsibilities and being with family. Accordingly, military
power is reliant on women partners “picking up the slack,” meaning they
rely on women performing additional household duties that reservists drop
in order to engage in military service (such as a greater amount of childcare)
and that are generated by military service (such as the complex care required
post-deployment). This is a somewhat different, though related, “gendered
story” from the traditional family set up on a military base whereby the
Army’s expectations of women are more apparent. The military’s reliance
on reservists’ women partners to socially reproduce military power is unac-
knowledged through the notion that it is the reservists’ “spare-time” that
is the only or primary thing the Army requires. Moreover, the potentially
depletive effects on the “spare-time,” leisure and health and wellbeing
of those women partners are altogether erased (Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas
2014). As reflected in broader economic trends, failure to recognize how
these women socially reproduce both the home and military power “disguises
the extent of gendered harm and undermines campaigns for gender justice”
(Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas 2014, 100).
The Army’s increased reliance on reservists has come at a time when not
only the military, but the family is under pressure in the midst of global reces-
sion, inflation and spending cuts. Though financial pressures could be alle-
viated by extra income from the Reserves, many families already rely on
two incomes which may already make childcare, other care commitments
and housework hard to manage. Moreover, civilian employment, which the
majority of reservists engage in, has seen a growth of evening and
weekend working, and the rise of a long-hours working culture, also influ-
enced broader economic pressures and political ones. Furthering labor
market flexibility has become common to both civilian and military work-
places. All this means that at the very same time that the Army is becoming
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a “greedier institution,” seeking “exclusive and undivided loyalty” from its sol-
diers (Coser 1974, 4), families and employers are also becoming “greedier”
about what they require of members and employees respectively. In research
on Israeli reservists, Lomsky-Feder, Gazit, and Ben-Ari (2008, 608) show that,
“during their men’s reserve service” women support and facilitate military
service through increased childcare, cooking, cleaning, and household main-
tenance responsibilities, and that “sociologically speaking,” “for the duration
of reserve duty these families become single-parent households.” For many
of the male reservists we interviewed, their ability to undertake Reserve activi-
ties similarly hinged on the assumption that their women partners would “just
get on with” such activities in their absence. As Roger, speaking about his wife,
stated:
I think she’s pretty long-suffering… I’m just very lucky, I mean… I didn’t sit
down and say “you know this could happen. How are we going to solve this?”
It was, “this is going to happen…we’re going to have to find a way round it.”
So… I took a lot for granted.
Similarly, Pam, a reservist’s wife, told us: “I just did it actually. I just made it
work as most women do.” This expectation that reservists’ women partners
would “make it work” was a common theme in our interviews with them
and with male reservists. As Felicity admitted:
It was more my responsibility of sorting out the children, which is fine, but you
do need to have prior warning…My commitments often at a weekend…
would be orientated around whether he was away or not. If I had to do some-
thing and he was away, then I wouldn’t do it.
This practice of women “just making it work” is less visible because according
to the Army, it is the Reservist’s spare-time that is utilized. In reality, this time is
rarely “spare.” As reservist Alex told us, “It’s a bit selﬁsh, yeah… but… I enjoy
it. I know it’s selﬁsh. It does give the chance to get away.” During interviews
with high-ranking reservists, we also came across several instances in which
they stated that whilst they had not originally intended to stay in the Army
for very long, as they progressed up the ranks they often hinted to their part-
ners that the next assignment would be “the last.” Such acts of momentary
appeasement were often serial occurrences during several different stages
of an Army career, suggesting a clear awareness of the pressure that
staying in the military placed on women partners. Ultimately though, the
desire to remain in the Army trumped this. As one senior ofﬁcer conceded,
“I have been saying to her that I am probably going to ﬁnish at the end of
this appointment, since I was a Captain.”
As Hooper (1999, 485) suggests, militaries have long invited men to enlist
and become “a man of the world”; to “flee the domestic hearth in the search of
manhood – the further the better.” This appears to be an enduring draw of
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military service. Though reservists join the Army for multiple reasons, salient
motives emerged including being “outdoorsy,” opportunities to travel and
do adventurous training, and deployments. Each involves leaving the “dom-
estic” sphere. Some of the language interviewees used to make sense of
their motivations for enlisting even drew directly on gender. For example,
Adam told us: “I know its cliché to say that every boy wants to be a soldier,
but that was very much me.” Similarly, Alex saw Reserve service as a source
of adventure, declaring that, “it was a way to basically play big boys’
cowboys and Indians… So, running around and being a complete idiot
with no responsibility and nothing else to worry about.” For Brad, listening
to his dad’s military service stories, and particularly his deployments, got
him interested in serving in the Reserve:
You listen to some of the stories and he’s got a couple of pictures up around the
house of his tours to Afghanistan and various things that he’s done… you think
… that looked pretty good, I’d quite like to do that.
The potential impact on women of the repeated absences entailed by reserve
service is often less visible, however, precisely because so many of these
women simply “get on with it.” As Lesley, a reservist’s wife, told us, absences
take their toll: “I would actually feel that he would come back home really
tired, he would have really late nights and I used to feel like everybody was
taking everything out of him and then we’re left with nothing.”
In many respects, despite popular notions of women’s increased social,
material and political gains, the Army’s reliance on traditional gendered div-
isions of labor are also echoed in wider society. Despite the introduction of
shared parental leave in the UK in April 2015, recent research suggests
fewer than 10 percent of working men have taken up more than 1 percent
of the time allowed, meaning women are still overwhelmingly responsible
for childcare. Whilst parental choice plays an important role, 80 percent of
the employees surveyed said their decision to share parental leave depended
on family finances (Osborne 2016). Moreover, an Oxfam report on UK house-
hold divisions of labor found that women spend over a quarter (28 percent)
more time on housework and nearly a third (31 percent) more time on child-
care than male partners, which contributes to a global division of gendered
labor in which “unpaid work by women such as cooking, cleaning and child-
care could be valued as much as $10 trillion a year – 13 percent of global GDP”
(Oxfam 2016). However, there are key differences that military partners have
to negotiate. As Hyde’s (2016) work on the wives of regular soldiers shows, the
state’s ability to deploy soldiers and continually prepare for war relies on mili-
tary wives also being in a state of constant “readiness.” War requires, for
example, women’s emotional labor to smooth out the ruptures brought
about by operational deployments and preparations for them, both for sol-
diers and other family members. Moreover, deployments and their possibility
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS 159
require that women maintain the supposed stability of home and hearth
despite them being continually disrupted by those very deployments and
preparations for them (Hyde 2016).
The possibility of increased deployment of reservists, significant numbers
of whom were deployed in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq interventions,8
means their women partners are also more likely required to be “ready” in
future.9 “Readiness” takes different forms. For Felicity, the challenge of her
husband’s deployment was the impact it had on her ability to juggle her
job with childcare. She said: “On his deployments, I had to change my
working practice because I couldn’t go on call and couldn’t work nights
because I had nobody to look after the children.” For others, it was emotional
labor that was most expected of them. Pam told us, for instance, that her
husband had a very different understanding of the impact of his deployment
and his subsequent return on her and the rest of their family than she did. She
stated: “He says, ‘Oh no, I’m not affected,’ and I say, ‘Well actually, you have
been affected’.” Similarly Kerry told us that: “He was different, he wasn’t
entirely himself, but he was happier than he’d been on R&R [rest and recup-
eration] and… It was quite a tough tour with lots of injuries, lots of life chan-
ging injuries.”
Studies of the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on veterans’
wives show that their lives tend to come to revolve around their husband’s
illness and needs (Dekel et al. 2005). Whilst not all of the women we inter-
viewed about the emotional labor involved in coping with their partner’s
deployment and return involved cases of PTSD, some form of complex
emotional labor was usually expected of them. As Erikson (2005, 349)
argues, the time and energy required of women providing emotional
support are frequently overlooked, because it is characterized as “interperso-
nal intimacy or love,” not labor. This, she argues, “parallels the once conven-
tional view of housework and childcare” wherein these tasks were
conceptualized as “components of a female role.” Recognizing emotional
labor as labor is key, therefore, to challenging the gendered scripts that
both normalize and conceal women’s emotional work.
Some of the military’s expectations of women partners take more
mundane forms like adapting to the peculiarities of military culture. Reservists’
women partners sometimes find themselves in situations where they are
expected to perform the “military spouse” role, despite most identify as civi-
lians. As Harriet relayed, such expectations can be awkward for reservists’ part-
ners. In a conversation about whether or not she had met many other women
partners of reservists, she said:
Harriet: I remember talking to one guy who is in Jay’s squadron… his
partner hadn’t come with him and he was like, “She won’t
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come anymore… She is not going to be dictated to by what she
can wear and… can’t wear”.
Interviewer: How funny. So, did you have to wear something quite specific
then?
Harriet: Well, yes, because in the mess where they do their functions and
things, if it’s a formal do and they are in their outfits with the
jackets and everything, then… you have to cover your shoulders
and you can’t wear anything above the knee… the women can’t
pour the port. There are a lot of things like that, which you’ve got
to love, but you’ve got to roll your eyes at, at the same time
[laughter].
The expectation that reservists’ women partners will come to events dressed
according to what the military deems “appropriate” betrays the continued
investment of the military in “essentialized masculine and feminine scripts”
wherewomen’s attiremust “satisfy amaledeﬁnition of attractiveness” that con-
forms to “a heteronormative paradigm” (Skidmore 2004, 234). Thus, despite
recent policy changes opening all ground close combat roles to women, the
military’s expectations of wives and women partners reinstates the military
as masculine and home and hearth as feminized and heteronormative.
As our interviews show, “picking up the slack” sometimes means women
taking on household labor that might otherwise be done by reservists if they
were at home, not soldiering, but can also involve women “picking up” additional
labor generated by the peculiar emotional and institutional demands of military
service. Thus, whilst the general demandsmade of these women are broadly con-
sistent with the gendered modes of social reproduction that national and global
markets have long relied on (Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas 2014), conditions specific
to themilitary, such as deployments, generate additional forms of gendered labor
like complex caregiving. As we also show, this social reproductive labor done by
reservists’ women partners depletes them physically, socially and emotionally
(Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas 2014) and can contribute to their time poverty, limit-
ing their access to leisure and other opportunities (Bryson 2007). Much as Rai,
Hoskyns, and Thomas (2014) have argued for the need to account for
women’s social reproduction and the depletion it entails to strengthen cam-
paigns for gender justice, by discussing the labor of reservists’ women partners,
and its depletive effects, we have sought to problematize the Army’s manipu-
lation of the idea that reserve service is merely a “spare-time” activity of the reser-
vist and to highlight just how significant women’s labor for the materialization of,
and preparation for, war is.
Home is where the heart is?
Thus far we have built on work that takes women’s work in the home seriously
by mapping out some of the specific ways that the labor of reservists’ women
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partners facilitates war and war preparedness. The expectation that both
soldier and partner will work to facilitate military readiness is contingent
upon multiple factors, however. In the regular Army, various structures
attempt to stabilize women’s support, from the provision of services like
housing to the normalization of moving out of that housing periodically
when a soldier is reposted (Gray 2016; Hyde 2016). For reservists’women part-
ners, however, support from the Army is largely limited to signposting them to
services provided by civilian agencies, or, during deployment, to occasional
briefings and issuing them with a military contact. Their geographical disper-
sal and independence from military structures may make their support for
military readiness more contingent and less easy to stabilize. Thus, whilst
reservists’ women partners do constitute a further reserve army of labor, by
being less beholden to the military’s formalized structures, they also have sig-
nificant capacity to destabilize military readiness, and with it war and war pre-
paredness, by withdrawing their labor.
This distance from the military’s formalized structures is reflected in one of
the ways reservists often try to maintain the support of women partners:
compartmentalizing Reserve service and minimizing its impact on “family
time.” Prior research suggests that reservists should, and can be, very good
at compartmentalizing given that they “constantly move between dimen-
sions of space and time and mediate social contexts of involvement and
knowledge,” from the workplace to the military to home (Lomsky-Feder,
Gazit, and Ben-Ari 2008, 598). However, several interviewees recounted
struggles with compartmentalization and military service often seeped into
the home. In this struggle between reservists and their women partners,
cracks in the military’s reliance on the readiness of both begin to show.
For many reservists, compartmentalization works in one direction: in defer-
ence to the Army. As Dom revealed:
I find it quite difficult to pull out my phone and think about my other life inter-
rupting green, because I’ve kind of got that ingrained 24/7. I’ve taken the
Queen’s shilling today; it’s the Queen’s day. Whereas the other way round if
the phone rings and the Adjutant’s got an issue I’ll answer it… [and] get on
with it straight away.
Compartmentalizing reserve service has become increasingly difﬁcult with
increased commitment expectations by the Army, but also technological
change that makes reservists more “reachable.” Whereas in the past, geo-
graphic dispersal might have meant Army business could only take place
“on site” on encrypted machines, Scott told us that reservists are now
issued with “MOD Blackberry’s with… email capacity” and that this was “a
double-edged sword, because it’s great because you can stay in touch, but
it’s also bad because people at battalion headquarters expect you to be in
touch.” Similarly, women partners also pointed to technology as a vehicle
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for reserve service seeping into home life and destabilizing compartmentali-
zation. For Harriet:
It’s the phone calls, into the evening, on a night when it’s not a Reserve night
and we’ve been out, we’re out on a walk or having dinner and he’s had to
take a call, well he feels like he has to take a call so I think it just infiltrates
into every aspect.
Whilst the imaginary of the hearth and home as a space apart from military
service can be important in sustaining gendered notions of what military
power protects, military power routinely seeps into home and hearth.
Whereas this “boundary” has always been porous for the women partners
of regulars (Gray 2016), it is less normalized for those of reservists and the irre-
gularity with which the military intrudes in this way could lead to withdrawals
of their support. A common tactic among reservists for ensuring that the
women in their lives will continue to put up with such interruptions is to
promise that at some amorphous future date, “quality time” together will
be forthcoming and recompense for time spent with the Reserves. As Roger
stated, “When I had leave I was full on with the family and we would do
sort of very special things to compensate for the fact that I was away a lot.”
Some reservists also promised to alleviate some of their women partners’
pressures to pursue their own ambitions, albeit at a later date:
We negotiated that really before I started [i.e., command], but there have been
re-negotiations… . “It’s only two and a half years and then you can concentrate
on going out and do your walks in Peru or whatever”. So, there’s been horse-
trading (Matthew, Reservist and Commanding Officer).
Whilst recent survey data suggests that 87 percent of reservists believe their
family values their military service (MoD 2017d), our research suggests that
maintaining this often involves reservists engaging in “horse-trading,” as
Matthew admitted, or other forms of ﬁnancial or moral “bribery” such as
promising that the annual bounty reservists receive in exchange for dedicat-
ing a set number of days per year to the Army will be used to pay for some-
thing beneﬁcial to the family. Tanya, one of the women reservists we
interviewed, did just this to maintain the support of her husband. She
admitted that,
I use it to my advantage, because what I’ve always done with the extra money
that we get. It always goes into a separate account and it’s the holiday fund… .
The Army money is always family money, because actually without the support
of my husband I wouldn’t be able to do it anyway. So, we all get… holidays
with it.
Tanya’s experience is a useful reminder that gender does not always map
neatly onto bodies and that whilst it is important to acknowledge that
home and hearth are usually “where the women are” or are at least expected
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to be (Enloe 1989), this is not always the case. Tanya serves in a combat unit,
which is dominated by men, and it is her husband who frequently picks up the
slack.
Such experiences of “horse-trading” suggest that partners’ objections can
be surmounted by reservists, enabling them to continue to serve rather
than destabilizing their ability to do so. Nevertheless, the promised benefits
to partners of the financial perks of Reserve service are often offset against
continued concerns about the lack of time spent together, which can take
their toll on relationships. For example, Harriet’s partner tried to sell a deploy-
ment to her as a source of extra income, but as she told us:
He was saying, “this is going to be a tour, but I’ll be able to get a decent sized
deposit” [for a house]. To be honest, my thoughts were, that’s brilliant, but it’s
not about the money. I would prefer to have you around for the next six months.
These pressures can be difﬁcult even in relationships where both members
are reservists. Whilst Rebecca is herself a committed reservist who under-
stands the pressures of the role through her own experience, she still found
herself supporting her partner’s reserve service and juggling her own
commitments:
Rebecca: I remember when it was just him in the Reserves and I stayed at
home and that wasn’t very nice, because I didn’t feel like I had
anything to do whilst he was doing all this stuff. I guess I resented
it that way.
Interviewer: So, it was having an impact at that point on how you felt?
Rebecca: Yes. I think it still does to be honest. I do understand, because I
think he has more pressures than I do because… I think he
wants to be promoted. They rely on him a lot more… He’s
been very busy recently, which has been quite hard.
Similarly, Tara relayed that these tensions could often affect other family
members and the relationship between spouses:
I can’t say that we didn’t have arguments about it, but we’ve been able to work it
out, but I’ve got really supportive parents. So, I suppose we didn’t have many of
those because I’d be able to ring my mum up and say, “Oh, we’ve both got to go
on this weekend, can you have the children?” It’s a bit like my mum and dad’s
been in the Reserves as well.
The voluntary nature of Reserve service – the fact that reservists can “vote
with their feet” at any time to draw on an expression frequently used by reser-
vists – makes the emotional contingency of military readiness more marked
than in regular military service. As Enloe (1989) has shown, the wives of
regular soldiers are arguably more in control of their contributions to sustain-
ing the military than some scholarship suggests, and family federations have
utilized this knowledge to gain recognition and support for their unpaid labor
that non-military women and reservists’ women partners can only dream of,
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from schooling and childcare support to subsidized travel, adult education
and training. Whilst many of these services are not available to reservists’ part-
ners, the voluntary nature of Reserve service, and their lack of reliance on the
Army for housing and other basic needs, means they arguably have more
scope to determine when and how to withdraw their labor, should they
wish to. In several interviews, we indeed detected that spousal support was
often predicated on the understanding that reservist commitments are volun-
tary and, thus, could be negotiated. As Pam stated, “the regular Army, they
normally all live on the same base and they all move around together and
the wives and the families just… toddle on behind them, that’s your lot.”
This is not how she or other women viewed their own experiences. Indeed,
some women saw their partner’s service as more of an opportunity than a
burden. As Lesley acknowledged: “I’ve now learnt to enjoy my space… I
like it when he comes back, but I also like it when he goes away… I can be
myself and I can meet my friends.”
One key milestone for some women was having children. This was
regarded as something likely to affect their support for their partner being
in the Reserves. As Kerry asserted: “I think if we had children it would be differ-
ent. I think it would be very different if he was going off for two weeks, it
would be a different story.” However, whilst the prospect of having children
raised similar issues for Harriet, the draw of Reserve service for her partner
meant she was unsure who would sacrifice what:
If we have kids and he leaves for a long spat of time, I don’t think it would be fair
on the kids to not see him for… but… I would fully support him if he wanted to
go for it and he was serious about… going with the TA [sic]… but… if it was in
an area of conflict then… to be totally honest, I would be petrified and I would
tell him that I would be just really worried at the thought of him going. At the
end of the day, I would support him wholeheartedly… but I would like to
think… if there were kids he would feel more of an obligation and a responsi-
bility to be there for them.
Thus, the negotiation of expectations of military readiness in Reservist families
is complex. There is greater potential for Reserve families to elevate family
needs over military service than the families of regular personnel. Yet, Harriet’s
account demonstrates some of the complications when women’s labor is in
emotional forms such as understanding the desire to serve. The potential
for disrupting war and war preparedness through withdrawing support for
reservists may, thus, be much more accidental and contingent than deliber-
ate, especially considering that most of the women we interviewed were
broadly supportive of their partners’ military service. Nonetheless, these
accounts of negotiation and unease begin to unsettle the discursive divide
between women’s everyday labors and military power (Chisholm and Stacho-
witsch 2016) to some extent. Regardless of whether or not these women are
fully aware of just how dependent military power and their partners are on
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their labor, their knowledge of the volunteer nature of Reserve service, their
refusal to “toddle behind” partners like the wives of regulars are expected
to do, and their use of their partner’s military service as an opportunity, all
suggest these women are not merely subjected to geopolitical power, they
are agents of it.
Conclusion
The British Army’s greater reliance on reservists ceding their “spare-time” to
conduct military service relies on reservists’ women partners to “pick up the
slack” and enable their men to serve. The notion that what the Army requires
foremost is reservists’ “spare-time” conceals the wider significance of the
unpaid, often invisible, labor of their women partners. By highlighting the
specific forms of labor reservists’ women partners do and how it depletes
them, we have instead sought to contribute to wider attempts to recognize
women’s work in order to challenge this invisibility (Rai, Hoskyns, and
Thomas 2014) and its co-optation. Whilst previous work on military families
suggests that, “the more the military services adapt to family needs, the
more committed will be both service members and their families to the insti-
tution” (Segal 1986, 34), our research suggests that not adapting to Reserve
families’ needs could be more beneficial to the Army, because it can
assume that a certain level of support from families will be forthcoming,
that women will “just get on with it.” Nevertheless, it is also important to
acknowledge that reservists’ women partners often have considerable
agency over their labor and when to withdraw it. Whether they see how
their labor sustains military power or not is not the issue, nor is the fact
that many of these women would also be most likely to withdraw their
support for pragmatic and personal reasons rather than lofty ideals like “dis-
rupting war.” What is most interesting is that in examining the details of their
lives it becomes possible to overcome tendencies to cast women as either
passive receptors of geopolitical power or active opponents to it; to see the
potential for disrupting and reconfiguring the geopolitical in the stuff of
everyday life. Their potential for disruption is significant precisely because
of its fluidity and contingency. At a time when the Army must adapt
towards a greater reliance on reservists due to public spending cuts, bound
up with wider neo-liberalizing tendencies to further labor market flexibility,
the contingent nature of these women’s support suggests that the reproduction
of military power is by no means inevitable. The invisible, yet significant, reliance
on these women to allow “spare-time” to be constituted as such, to “pick up the
slack” left by the absence of their reservist partners, and to take on additional
labors generated by the military, is precarious because military power is contin-
gent upon reservists’ women partners doing all this whilst tolerating their part-
ners engaging in what is essentially a voluntary activity. Both the Army’s reliance
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on the labor of reservists’ women partners, and the agency these women have
over their labor, demonstrates that war is not just the business of states and sta-
tespersons, but is also in the details (Lutz 2006). War is made possible by a mul-
tiplicity of everyday power relations including the unpaid, unacknowledged, and
often invisible, labor of women in hearth and home.
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Notes
1. All names have been changed.
2. Though reservists engage in various activities other than “war,” such as home-
land defence and support of civilian infrastructure, these can contribute directly
to the state’s ability to wage war by “freeing up” regulars to be deployed. More-
over, the ability to wage war at will means maintaining a standing military. So,
simply by virtue of enacting military service, reservists facilitate war and war
preparedness.
3. Whilst reservists are initially “enlisted” for 12 years or up to the age of 55, they
are not obliged to serve for any specific period and can leave at any point, unless
compulsorily mobilized.
4. In 2011, the British military began giving new regular (not reserve) recruits the
option to disclose their sexual orientation through the Recruit Trainee Survey
and the Officer Cadet Survey. Ninety-five percent of respondents to the 2016–
17 Recruit Trainee Survey and 97 percent of respondents to the Officer Cadet
Survey reported their sexual orientation as “heterosexual/straight” (MoD 2017a,
2017b). A 2016 response to a Freedom of Information request stated that since
November 2014 “all Service personnel have… been encouraged to declare
their sexual orientation, since this will give us a better understanding of the com-
position of our Armed Forces and help ensure our policies and practices fully
support our personnel,”which presumably include reservists. The same response
is clear that the statistics only provide “a partial picture of the diversity across the
Armed Forces as it is not compulsory to record the information on sexual orien-
tation on our Joint Personnel Administration database and only 11 percent of
members of the Armed Forces have chosen to do so.” Of those 11 percent com-
prising 22,860 people, 570 or 2.5 percent identified as gaymen, 530 or 2.3 percent
identified as Gaywomen/lesbian, 290 or 1.2 percent identified as bisexual, and 21,
470 or 94 percent identified as heterosexual/straight.
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5. According to the UK Armed Forces Biannual Diversity Statistics as of 1 October
2017 (MoD 2017c), women comprise 13.2 percent of Army reservists, compared
to 9.1 percent of regular Army personnel. There are also more women officers in
the Army Reserve (17.9 percent) than in the regular Army (11.8 percent). Both
the regular Army and the Army Reserve remain dominated by men. It is also
worth noting that Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic personnel (not disaggregated
by sex) comprise just 10.6 percent of the regular Army and 5.8 percent of the
Army Reserve. Declaring ethnic origin is not compulsory, but 99.2 percent of
regulars and 98.9 percent of reservists declared this information.
6. See note 4.
7. Four out of five reservists (80%) are either full-time, part-time or self-employed
(MoD 2017d). Given these high levels of employment, we purposively sampled
reservists who have to balance some form of employment with their reserve
service.
8. At what is defined as the “peak” of operations in 2004, reservists made up 20
percent of those serving in Iraq and 12 percent of those in Afghanistan (MoD
2014).
9. It is important to note, however, that the MoD has tried to mobilize only those
reservists who have stated a willingness to voluntarily deploy, rather than rely on
a compulsory Call-Out Notice.
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